Quality Safety Edge: Behavior Based Safety -- Culture: A Behavioral Perspective

“Culture” is one of those words that we tend to overuse both in our discussions and in our literature on management and organization change. It is one of those words that we use loosely, and everyone thinks that they know what it means, but many of us would be hard put to define it.

As a name for a consistent pattern of behavior or results, culture may be quite reasonable. In such usage, culture simply refers to the fact that certain events typically generate certain kinds of behavior on the part of people within the organization. A problem with such terms arises however when explanations are required. If asked, for example, why our incident rate is increasing, and the answer is that we have a bad safety culture, “culture” is no longer just a name for a collection of behaviors and results, but has become the explanation. But, since the only evidence for the bad safety culture is the very same behavior or result that the culture supposedly explains, it has become an explanatory fiction.

Not only does this explanatory use of the term “culture” fail to add to our understanding of the causes of people’s behavior or the results we achieve, it actually diverts us from seeking true causes because it leads us to believe that we already understand the situation. And, worse still, if we accept that our behavior is caused by this abstract concept “culture”, we have effectively prevented ourselves from improving our behavior because we have no reliable, empirically validated method for changing culture. We can’t directly observe and measure culture; therefore we can’t easily change culture.

What is Culture?

Culture is much more than simply what people do. Imagine two maintenance mechanics fixing a piece of equipment in two different organizations, Company A and Company B. The behavior may look the same in both companies, but in Company A, the mechanic was told by a supervisor to make the repair, while in the Company B, the mechanic recognized the problem and initiated the repair. We would often describe the culture in these two organizations as very different. Thus a definition of culture should include not only what we do but why we do it.

In safety, we have become increasingly concerned about this aspect of culture. No longer are we content to write and enforce safety regulations or to create and train people in safe work procedures. It isn’t that these efforts are unnecessary. Safety procedures and training are essential elements of any safety process. But because we value our safety, we demand continuous improvement, and training and enforcement cannot take us to the next level. We need to understand the reasons people work safely or take risks at work and we need to create a work environment that supports people in working safely.

Wanting people to value safety or to work safely for the right reasons is an intensely practical goal. To be effective in the long term, our safety efforts must produce an organization where people will work safely when there is no threat of punishment from other people. This is when we would say that they have come to value safety. If, on the other hand, we produce an organization where people only work safely because of the threat of criticism or other negative consequences, then we cannot rely on them working safely when such threat is no longer present, i.e., when the probability of being caught is low. We would say that such people do not value safety. So we are striving to produce a culture where safety is a core value. If safety is a core value, then the members of the culture will work safely all of the time, whether anyone else is there to observe them or not. This is truly a “safety culture.”

If our definition of culture is to include not just what people do, but also why they do it, our discussion should clarify the factors that influence behavior. One way of defining culture is to break it into the formal and informal processes that impact on behavior. The formal processes are the formal systems, policies and procedures that the organization uses to influence behavior within the organization. The informal systems, on the other hand, are the social interactions between group members that sanction certain forms of behavior within the organization. The informal processes include social norms and values that define the practices that are supported by the social environment.

Figure 1 presents an oversimplified model that builds on this distinction. It shows the primary elements that we must align to create a healthy culture within an organization. Thus if we wish to create an effective safety culture, we must first create a vision or mission that describes our ideal, then establish a process to achieve our results and define values that clarify how we will work together. In this model, “process” refers to the formal systems and includes the elements referred to above. “Values” refers to the informal systems. In a simple sense, “process” refers to the tasks and procedures – what we are going to do to achieve results. “Values” on the other hand, refers to “how” we are going to accomplish those tasks, often describing how we are going to treat one another in the process.

Behavior is a particularly important element of our model because it is key to both our processes and our values. We need people to perform certain tasks, and we want those tasks accomplished in a way that is consistent with our values (in a way that shows respect for fellow employees, etc.). Good managers and healthy organizations achieve a balanced emphasis on each of the elements presented by this model.

Balance

In organizations that are out of balance, managers tend to emphasize one element of the model over others, typically either process or results. People who report to these managers then reflect their manager's style. In addition, new managers tend to learn their management skills from those in the existing hierarchy. The organization may not focus its attention exclusively on process or results, but, because managers tend to hire and promote people like themselves, the emphasis becomes and remains unbalanced. The result is that many managers will spend too much time on only one of these two important elements.

Overemphasis on results

Many American managers manage their employees according to the results achieved by the employees. In many cases, we train managers to manage by results, and then use systems of annual objectives and appraisals that maintain an unbalanced emphasis on results. Managers who enter the private sector from the military often typify a strong results orientation. Industries that hire them, such as aerospace companies, defense contractors, and nuclear utilities, have frequently adopted such an orientation. Companies that over-emphasize results can be very successful, but they often achieve their success only through Herculean efforts by top managers and key employees who frequently work extra-long hours. This orientation may also exact a high personal cost. These companies typically report substantial levels of stress characterized by a high rate of employee burnout, high turnover, and higher than average rates of participation in Employee Assistance Programs. Furthermore, this approach often creates a perception among employees that “All management really cares about is the numbers,” the reference being to budget figures, production records, efficiency targets, or safety statistics.

In such numbers-oriented companies, when the results are not achieved, the tendency is to find someone to blame. The resulting fear and distrust often make improvement efforts difficult. Employees resist efforts to establish effective performance measures because they are skeptical about how managers will use those measures. Employees feel frustrated and believe that the organization does not care about them. In fact, results-oriented organizations seldom systematically address how managers and employees should treat one another. The result is that the quality of personal relationships can become a further barrier to any significant culture change.

In safety, “condition of employment” policies and incentive systems that unintentionally encourage employees to hide or overlook accidents often indicate an organization that over-emphasizes results. Such policies implicitly threaten employees with the potential loss of their jobs, income, or promotional opportunities if they report an injury that results from a failure to comply with a company safety requirement. So, they may claim that the injury occurred at home. Or they may inaccurately report that the accident occurred in spite of full compliance with company procedure, saying something like “I was wearing my safety glasses, but this metal filing somehow got around them.” They may say similar things if a minor recordable injury jeopardizes a group’s chances of getting a safety award. The more significant the award to group members, the greater the probability that a minor injury will not be reported accurately.

Overemphasis on process

A more recent focus for many American managers is on process. As quality improvement efforts have grown, American managers have learned to look more closely at the processes by which their organizations achieve results. Using such methods as clarifying requirements, standardizing procedures, and establishing measures for key steps in the work process, this approach has helped increase the consistency in work processes that is required for continuous improvement.

While a process emphasis works well for addressing problems with the work process, many of the problems in today's organizations are not in any particular process but in the relationships between employees and managers. Too often with a process approach, the tendency is either to create a new system or fine tune an existing system, rather than deal with the root causes of relationship problems. Today's nuclear utilities, for example, are very strong on encouraging employees to identify potential nuclear safety problems. Their approach has been to create a system that encourages employees to report concerns and problems anonymously for independent investigation. The result is often a growing bureaucracy that discourages personal responsibility and fails to address the cause of the concern or problem. In most cases, the root cause is managerial practices that have destroyed the interpersonal relationship between managers and employees, thereby creating distrust and discouraging employees from bringing safety matters to the attention of the appropriate line management.

Most of today's problem-solving tools are useful for addressing process issues, but they are often not adequate for addressing behavioral issues. Many of the tools assume that all problems are a function of the system and the efforts to resolve those problems often add complexity, bureaucracy and paperwork. Such solutions increase costs and compete with other tasks that have more value to an organization. The bureaucracy in process-oriented organizations creates the perception that “All management cares about is the paperwork.” Employees who work in a process-oriented culture tend to attack problems and change processes without identifying or even considering that the problems may be rooted in behavior and personal relationships.

Many companies have adopted an observation-based behavioral safety process to improve compliance with safety procedures. Alas, simply implementing the basic elements of a behavioral safety process does not always work. Companies can encounter problems in getting employees to conduct needed observations, in getting employees to provide appropriate feedback to other employees, and with employees completing observation checklists without actually conducting safety observations. These problems may indicate an overemphasis on the reporting process and a lack of adequate attention to the values required for a successful implementation of safety improvement efforts.

Lack of alignment

The other problem, organizations with cultural elements that are out of alignment, has more variation and is often more difficult to address. This misalignment can take place between almost any of the elements of organizational culture. Stated values may not be consistent with actual behavior. This might occur when a manager routinely verbalizes support for the company’s stated value for safety, yet routinely punishes anyone who stops production to address a safety concern. Or the lack of alignment can occur within a single element of the culture model. Two processes may support different kinds of behavior. For example, a behavioral safety process that encourages discussion of unsafe acts and reporting of minor incidents may conflict with a compensation program that ties compensation to the (reported) rate of OSHA recordable incidents.

How do we Create a Safety Culture?

Addressing the safety culture of an organization requires utilization of a state-of-the-art process to address safety and an alignment of existing systems to support the mission and values of the organization. Currently, the only empirical approach to improving safety that has been proven to be effective is a behavioral safety process. Behavioral safety is the only approach that has routinely produced significant reductions in incidents in well-designed research studies. The approach involves employees using a systematically developed checklist as the basis for feedback to one another on critical safety practices observed in their work-areas. (For a more thorough discussion of behavioral safety, see Geller, 1996; Krause, Hidley and Hodson, 1990; or McSween, 1995.)

Assuring alignment of the elements of a culture is more complex and requires a detailed assessment to identify the elements that need attention and develop an action plan appropriate to a given organization. To address a lack of alignment between values and behavior typically requires an educational process targeting improved supervisory and managerial skills. Often aligning the formal processes to support the mission and values requires special attention to the organization’s team, feedback and compensation systems.

Creating a culture that has safety as one of its core values is not easy. It is a complex task that requires a long-term commitment. A behavioral safety process is a state-of-the-art process that provides a solid foundation for the employee involvement and continuous improvement that are critical to success.

Bibliography

Geller, E. S. The Psychology of Safety: How to improve behaviors and attitudes on the job. New York, NY: Chilton, 1996.

Krause, T.R. and Hidley, J. H. and Hodson, S. J. The Behavior-Based Safety Process. New York, NY, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1990.

McSween, T. E. The Values-Based Safety^™. New York, NY, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1995.

Published in Proceedings of the 1998 ASSE Behavioral Safety Symposium: Light Up Safety in the New Millenium, American Society of Safety Engineers, Orlando, FL, 1998, p. 43-50.